





The funded status of the VRS plans has 
improved in recent years, in part because of 
strong investment performance.
–  Joint Legislative Audit and Review 
Commission, December 2017
The VRS is actuarially sound.




ublic pension funds for state employees 
should, to paraphrase an old English 
proverb, be seen and not heard. Yet, this 
decade has seen a rising tide of dire warnings 
about state pension funds in the United States. 
The Pew Charitable Trusts estimated that 
at the end of 2018, state pension funds were 
underfunded by an estimated $1.5 trillion and 
that the problem is likely to get worse in the 
coming years.1
Why? Many state pension funds assume that 
they can generate returns far in excess of 
the market. Doing so lessens the demands on 
state and local budgets today but increases the 
unfunded liabilities of the pension funds in the 
future. Not only do some funds assume they 
can beat the market, they may also understate 
their liabilities. When the bill comes due, 
states and localities are going to have to make 
hard choices. Should they increase taxes, 
decrease spending on schools, police and other 
functions, or reduce retirement benefits for 
state and local government employees, or some 
combination of all of the above?
It is natural, therefore, to spend some time 
assessing the circumstances and performance 
of the Virginia Retirement System 
(VRS), which manages the assets in the 
Commonwealth’s public employee retirement 
systems.
1   Pew Charitable Trusts, “The State Pension Funding Gap: 2017,” 
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Our work in this chapter is an independent, noncommissioned, 
noncompensated analysis of specific issues relating to the VRS. The 
available evidence suggests that the VRS has been well managed and has 
outperformed many state pension funds. Fortunately for the members of 
the VRS and the taxpayers of Virginia, the VRS has avoided most of the 
difficulties that have afflicted many other state pension plans.  
Our work benefited immensely from face-to-face conversations with VRS 
officials. We did not always find ourselves in agreement with the views of 
the VRS on all issues, but one must credit the VRS for its willingness to 
engage and to respond to our queries. More public agencies should emulate 
it in this regard.
We suggest four policy changes that would improve the performance of 
the VRS, reduce the likelihood that the Commonwealth will confront 
serious problems in the future and ultimately benefit its participants.2 
One of these changes would have the VRS rely more on low-cost, 
indexed public equity investments instead of paying analysts to actively 
manage the same funds. If the VRS had followed this strategy, we 
estimate it could have earned an additional $3.4 billion on its public 
equity portfolio between 1992 and 2017. There may be additional gains 
from indexing other segments of the VRS portfolio, but we do not deal 
with those possibilities in this chapter.
Some Background
The VRS manages and invests pension funds sent to it by public bodies 
in Virginia. On March 31, 2019, the VRS served more than 722,000 
members, retirees and beneficiaries and held $80.4 billion in net assets. 
VRS payments to recipients included $4.75 billion in retirement benefits 
and another $416 million in other postretirement benefits.3 The VRS 
ranks as the 15th-largest public pension systems in the United States.
Because the VRS is overseen by the Virginia General Assembly, it often 
ends up having to play the financial cards dealt it by legislators. These 
2 A July 9, 2018, audit of the VRS by GRS Retirement Consulting declared the VRS “actuarially sound,” file:///H:/State%20of%20the%20Commonwealth%202018/Pensions/VRS%20Audit%20July%209,%202018.pdf. 
3 Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission, VRS Oversight Report (July 2019), http://jlarc.virginia.gov/pdfs/reports/Rpt521-2.pdf.
4 Virginia Retirement System, Comprehensive Financial Annual Report, 2018.
cards historically included inadequate funding by the General Assembly 
of the state’s public employee pension plans. Consequently, the VRS is 
“underfunded”; that is, its current asset holdings, prudently invested, are 
insufficient to produce the income required to meet anticipated future 
obligations. On June 30, 2018, the market value of the assets held by 
the VRS was equal to only 78.1% of its actuarially accrued liabilities.4 
On the plus side, however, the General Assembly has, in recent years, met 
its financial obligations to its pension funds. The General Assembly also 
(wisely, in our view) established an independent board to govern the VRS. 
There is widespread agreement that the independent board has improved 
the management and performance of the VRS, enabled it to attract and 
retain superior personnel, and increased its reputation among lawmakers, 
financial professionals and the public.
The General Assembly determines what kind of public employee 
retirement benefits Virginia offers. In recent years, it has exercised 
its authority to move the Commonwealth away from exclusive reliance 
upon “defined benefit” pension programs (that guarantee participants 
specific future benefits) toward hybrid programs that include both 
defined benefit provisions and “defined contribution” provisions. Under 
defined contribution programs, the Commonwealth places pension 
contributions into accounts that the participants subsequently own. The 
Commonwealth’s financial liability ends there, a circumstance that is not 
true when employees are in defined benefit programs. In the latter case, 
the Commonwealth is obligated to fund previously agreed upon benefits 
over what sometimes can be long time periods.   
Most new VRS participants, except for hazardous duty employees, 
now are automatically enrolled in the hybrid retirement plan. The 
federal government and the private sector moved in this direction some 
years ago. Now, all but a few private-sector employers provide defined 
contribution programs rather than defined benefit programs. While 
defined benefit pension programs contain some attractive features for 
both the Commonwealth and participants, they have become the source of 
significant fiscal stress in numerous states because the financial obligations 
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of the states to employees carry on long into the future. Defined benefit 
plans threaten to bankrupt states, such as Illinois. Hence, moving Virginia 
away from defined benefit pension programs is a change essential to the 
future fiscal stability of the Commonwealth and its local government units.
While each state has its own distinctive pension fund, there are common 
characteristics among these funds. Funds that have encountered financial 
difficulties have done so because of one or more of the following decisions:
1.  Overly generous pension and attached health care provisions 
benefitting public employees,
2.  Generous cost-of-living adjustments that exacerbate funding 
challenges,
3.  Grossly inadequate funding of pension obligations by governors and 
legislatures,
4.  Overly optimistic rate of return assumptions for their investable assets 
that match neither experience nor the likely future, and
5.  Excessive investment of assets in costly actively managed funds that 
have performed poorly relative to the overall market.  
If there is a lesson here, it is that problems in state pension funds 
characteristically are ignored by those in power, build slowly over time 
and then emerge as full-blown crises. Timely action now on the part of the 
Commonwealth can reduce the risk that the VRS might drift into trouble 
in the future. Attempting to address the vulnerabilities of the VRS will be 
more difficult when the next economic recession inevitably appears.
5 Information provided in a communication from the VRS to Old Dominion University’s Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy.
6 Virginia Retirement System, “Actuarial Valuation of Political Subdivisions,” (June 30, 2017).
Virginia’s Public Employee 
Pension Systems
The Commonwealth maintains six different public employee pension 
systems: (1) the system that serves most state government employees, who 
are or were located in 227 state agencies; (2) the system that serves about 
600 special governmental authorities, cities, towns and school divisions; 
(3) the state teachers’ retirement system, which is the largest of the six; 
(4) the state police officers’ retirement system (SPORS); (5) the Virginia 
law officers’ retirement system (VaLORS); and (6) the judicial retirement 
system (JRS). The VRS manages all state pension funds, whose individual 
members (current or prospective retirees) totaled more than 722,000 in 
March 2019.
Graph 1 reports the net asset positions at the end of the 2018 fiscal year 
for each of the major pension systems that comprise the VRS. The VRS 
invests the money sent to it by jurisdictions that range from towns, cities 
and counties to school districts and economic development agencies. The 
combined assets of the different systems are invested jointly. However, 
the VRS only can invest funds that it receives from local government 
bodies. If an employer does not fully fund its contractual obligations to 
its current and former employees, then this is a problem that will accrue 
to the employer instead of the entire VRS system. According to the VRS, 
the average funding level of local government pension systems managed 
by the VRS was 92.2% in summer 2018.5 However, funding levels varied – 
from the town of Haysi in Dickenson County, having assets valued at only 
42.34% of its anticipated obligations; to Loudoun County, at 91.39%; to 
Newport News, at 125.69%.6
2019 STATE OF THE COMMONWEALTH REPORT
64 THE VIRGINIA RETIREMENT SYSTEM: ASSESSING ITS CHALLENGES AND CHARTING ITS FUTURE■
GRAPH 1
EMPLOYERS’ NET PENSION LIABILITY OF THE MAJOR COMPONENTS OF THE VIRGINIA RETIREMENT SYSTEM  
(BILLIONS OF $)
Source: Virginia Retirement System, Comprehensive Financial Annual Report (June 30, 2018)
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Income pensioners receive from the VRS comes from two primary 
sources: (1) the financial contributions of workers and employers covered 
by the VRS; and (2) the income earned by the VRS from the assets it 
invests. Nationally, investment earnings typically provide about 61% of 
promised benefits, but were 67% for the VRS in 2016. Higher investment 
income percentages can reflect greater investment success or lower 
contribution levels, or both.7  
Unfunded Liabilities
At first glance, the financial economics associated with pension funds 
are simple. Employers and employees contribute money to a fund that 
invests those funds to support payments to the employees, typically when 
they retire. To the extent that employers make more generous financial 
promises than they can keep to their employees concerning the size and 
duration of their retirement stipends, then employers and their employees 
either must contribute more money, or higher rates of return must be 
earned on the funds being invested on behalf of the employees. In Virginia, 
the benefits VRS participants receive are determined by state statute.
When the funds on hand to deal with anticipated future retirement 
obligations are insufficient to meet those obligations, then this is called 
an unfunded actuarial accrued liability (UAAL) in pension fund parlance. 
“Anticipated” is an important modifier in the previous sentence.  Among 
other things, the moneys that must be paid out by pension funds depend 
on the salaries that employees will earn, when employees choose to retire, 
whether they are eligible by statute to claim disability, and how long they 
live. Alas, none of these events can be known with certainty.  
7  National Association of State Retirement Administrators, “Public Pension Plan Investment Return Assumptions” (February 2018), www.nasra.org/files/Issue Briefs/NASRAInvReturnAssumptBrief.pdf, and the Virginia Retirement 
System, “VRS Stress Test and Sensitivity Analysis” (June 2017).
8 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2018.
9 https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2019/06/the-state-pension-funding-gap-2017.
Roughly two-thirds of Americans have left the labor force by age 66, and 
half leave the labor force between ages 61 to 65. Retirement ages tended 
to decline in the United States until the economic reverses of the Great 
Recession and changes in Social Security eligibility altered the calculations 
for many individuals. Data from the U.S. Census’ 2018 American 
Community Survey tell us that the average retirement age for Virginians 
was 65.  
The lengthening life span of Americans poses a significant challenge to the 
viability of many state pension funds. The expected life span of a newly 
born baby was 70.8 years in 1970 but had risen to 78.6 by 2017.8 Simply 
put, when pension recipients live longer, a larger asset base is required to 
take care of them.  
Public employee pension funds in most states have UAALs. Graph 2 
reveals that as of June 30, 2018, the VRS had a UAAL in excess of $19.7 
billion. Stated differently, the market value of the VRS’s assets was 
78.1% of its UAAL on that date. The 78.1% funding ratio represented a 
significant increase from the low of 60.1% on June 30, 2009, and a 4.7% 
increase from June 30, 2017. Now is not the time to declare victory, as a 
significant gap remains between assets and liabilities.
Things also could have been much worse. According to the Pew 
Charitable Trusts’ most recent report on state pension funds,9 states 
reported $4.1 trillion in liabilities and $2.9 trillion in assets in 2017. 
On average, states had only 69% of the assets needed to fully fund 
their pension obligations. Kentucky’s funding level was only 34% 
in 2017, and four other states (Colorado, California, Illinois and 
New Jersey) were below 50%. Only eight states had sufficient assets 
to cover 90% of their obligations, while 24 states were below 70% 
funding.
The VRS has not always been actuarially underfunded. From 2000 to 
2002, it possessed assets that exceeded 100% of its estimated future 
actuarial financial obligations. Several developments altered this. First, 
the rates of return earned by the VRS fell. The 16-month meltdown 
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in equity prices that began in October 2007 played a significant role.10 
Second, the VRS reduced its rate of discount two times during the 
succeeding decade (a point we discuss below), and this amplified its 
estimated future obligations. Third, enhanced benefits increased the VRS’s 
obligations. Fourth, the Commonwealth failed to contribute the VRS 
board’s actuarially determined contributions.  
This final point is important. From 1993 to 2018, the General 
Assembly fully funded its own agreed-upon, legally required pension 
contributions to statewide retirement systems only six times (2001, 
2005, 2006, 2016, 2017 and 2018). In 2003, the General Assembly 
made no contribution at all. From 1992 to 2016, the average level of 
annual funding compared to the amount required by statute during 
this period was 72%.11 The modicum of good news is that the General 
Assembly fully funded its contributions in the most recent three years 
and is poised to do so again in 2019. Weakening economic growth and, 
consequently, state revenues, may place this streak in jeopardy in the 
near future.
The VRS reports that if the Commonwealth had made the contributions 
required of it by statute, then the VRS now would have almost 90% of its 
estimated future actuarial financial obligations rather than the current 
79%.12 This is a major reason why the gap between the market value of 
VRS assets and its actuarial accrued liability expanded (as one can see in 
Graph 2) during and after the Great Recession. The pension fund reforms 
begun by the General Assembly in 2010, plus more favorable investment 
results, have begun to redress this situation.
Nationally, there is broad agreement that state expenditures on Medicaid 
and pensions have crowded out expenditures on other items, such as 
education and transportation. The Wall Street Journal reported in 2018 
that the proportion of state and local tax revenues devoted to Medicaid 
and public-sector pensions was the highest in almost 60 years.
10 The S&P 500 Index fell from 1,516.80 on Oct. 12, 2007, to 735.09 on Feb. 13, 2009. 
11 Virginia Retirement System, “VRS Stress Test and Sensitivity Analysis” (June 2017).
12 This statement was included in a communication from the VRS to Old Dominion University’s Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, dated July 6, 2018.
13  Cezary Podkul and Heather Gillers, “Why Are States So Strapped for Cash?  There Are Two Big Reasons,” The Wall Street Journal (March 29, 2018), www.wsj.com/articles/why-are-states-so-strapped-for-cash-there-are-two-big-
reasons-1522255521.
14 Pew Charitable Trusts, “The State Pension Funding Gap 2017,” June 27, 2019.
15 Virginia Retirement System, “VRS Stress Test and Sensitivity Analysis” (December 2018), https://www.varetire.org/Pdf/Publications/VRS-Stress-Test-and-Sensitivity-Analysis-2018.pdf.
Two-thirds of all additional revenues went to fund Medicaid and 
pensions between 2008 and 2016. In 2016, city and state governments 
spent about $105 billion on public employee pensions, dramatically up 
from about $29 billion in 2001.13 
Increasing pension liabilities and funding gaps not only command a 
greater share of public resources (when states are faced with a pension 
crisis), but also time and attention. Facing significant funding gaps, 
pension contributions increased 424% in Illinois, 267% in Kentucky and 
more than 100% in New Jersey from 2007 to 2017.14 Even with these 
increases, pension funding gaps continued to increase in each of these 
states.
The General Assembly recognized this possibility and related public 
employee pension issues when it created the Virginia Commission 
on Employee Retirement Security and Pension Reform in 2016. The 
commission has issued several recommendations consistent with the 
analysis presented in this chapter. The new commission also recommended 
legislation that would codify existing VRS practice to perform and publish 
the results of stress tests that assess the system’s financial viability under 
a variety of economic scenarios. These reports were released in June 
2017 and December 2018.15 Thus, it is fair to say that neither the General 
Assembly nor the VRS has been ignoring the challenges in front of them.  
What is needed now is additional action.  
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GRAPH 2
MARKET VALUE OF SYSTEM ASSETS AND ACTUARIAL ACCRUED LIABILITY IN BILLIONS OF DOLLARS: 
VIRGINIA RETIREMENT SYSTEM, 2008-2017
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Evaluating The 
Performance Of The VRS
Public pension funds exist for a variety of reasons, some of which are not 
strictly economic. Management guru Peter Drucker is one of many who 
have argued that pension contributions by employers instill a sense of 
belonging in employees and increase their morale.16 Improved morale may 
increase employee productivity, lower turnover and, ultimately, improve 
the bottom line.     
It is well beyond the scope of this chapter to examine the morale of 
participants in the VRS.  Instead, in evaluating VRS performance, we will 
focus on three variables: (1) the rates of return earned by the VRS on the 
funds entrusted to it; (2) the variability of those rates of return; and (3) 
the cost expended in achieving its performance. In a nutshell, we will ask: 
What is the average rate of return earned by the VRS, how variable has 
been that return and what has been the cost of achieving such? 
One should understand that tradeoffs nearly always exist among the three 
criteria. Usually, it is not possible to increase rates of return on investable 
funds without also assuming additional risk. The other side of this coin is 
that it is very difficult to reduce investment risk without also sacrificing 
some return. Further, some investment strategies are more expensive to 
implement than others. Complicating this relationship is that one may 
not necessarily buy improved performance by paying skilled investment 
advisers to provide advice and counsel. 
It is vital to recognize that an infinite number of return/risk/cost 
combinations exist. No single one of these combinations can be said to 
be absolutely “right” unless one has clearly identified preferences with 
respect to risk and return. For example, is it better to realize an average 
rate of return of 9% that is highly variable, or a 7% average rate of return 
that is quite stable?
Some pension fund choices effectively are predetermined. Suppose a public 
pension fund must earn at least a certain rate of return, say 7%. From the 
16 His views are expressed in “Manage with Courage,” the Drucker Institute (Sept. 28, 2018), www.drucker.institute/news-post/manage-with-courage.
outset, this eliminates a set of conservative investment options. Stability 
of the returns earned on invested funds might also be an important 
criterion. It may be unacceptable for a pension fund to realize an average 
rate of return of 7% over a 10-year period via boom or bust strategies that 
generate 20.0+% rates of return in some years, but -5% rates of return in 
other years.   
VRS management and its board of trustees ultimately choose (perhaps 
implicitly) a desired return/risk/cost combination. Presumably, this choice 
reflects the VRS’s evaluation of accumulated past economic history as well 
as its estimates of future developments. Of course, subsequent economic 
fluctuations may result in the VRS, or any pension fund, experiencing a 
return/risk/cost combination very different from the one it selected.
Retrospectively, however, one can evaluate the results of any investment 
strategy and stack it up against known alternatives. Hindsight continues 
to be wonderful. On occasion, one might discover that identical results 
(say, a 7% certain rate of return) could have been obtained with less 
volatility than actually experienced, or perhaps achieved at a lower cost. 
This knowledge might inform a different set of choices in the future, 
though not necessarily. Consider the significant decline in public equity 
prices that occurred from 2007 to 2009, or the run-up in public equity 
prices that occurred subsequently. These were wrenching, but not 
necessarily unusual events. Making future investment decisions based on 
spells such as these could lead to less than optimal decisions if the same 
circumstances aren’t duplicated in the future. 
After-the-fact analyses of what the VRS or any investor should have 
done – had they known what was going to happen – are revealing, but not 
necessarily definitive, or always subjectively fair. Decision makers must act 
when required to do so and face uncertainty when they choose their course 
of action. On the other hand, if one focuses on choices that might have 
been made, and these alternatives consistently are superior to the choices 
made, then this dissonance is worthy of attention. 
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We argue that the tendency of the VRS to downplay the superior rates 
of return and lower costs of many index funds over the past 10 to 25 
years is a prime example. The VRS argues that the period 2008-2018 
featured unusual economic conditions. Additionally, the VRS points 
out that the performance of the indexed public equity funds often 
has been more volatile than that of the total VRS portfolio. These 
points are legitimate, yet questions remain. Were the costs of actively 
managed funds offset by improved returns and increased stability or 
did the VRS pay too much for too little return relative to index funds?
17  Michael Martz, “Virginia pension contribution rates likely to rise as investment returns decline,” Richmond Times-Dispatch, Oct. 18, 2019.
18  See “Observations,” http://observationsandnotes.blogspot.com/2009/03/average-annual-stock-market-return.html, for Dow Jones Industrial Average rates of return data.
The Assumed Rate Of Return
How does the VRS know how well its asset portfolio will perform in the 
future and will this be enough for the VRS to meet its obligations? The 
answer is, it doesn’t, but neither does any other pension fund. The world 
is full of uncertainties. We could witness a stock market crash like the 
22.61% single-day decline in the Dow Jones Industrial Average in 1987, or 
once again experience 17% average mortgage rates as we did in 1981.  
The VRS does not know what is going to happen in the future and 
therefore must make astute, educated assumptions about how asset 
markets are going to behave. Prior to 2010, the VRS assumed it would 
average a 7.5% rate of return. Until October 2019, the VRS assumed 
its assets portfolio would average a 7% rate of return. However, the 
VRS board recently approved lowering a reduction in its assumed 
rate of return to 6.75%. This action is conditional on approval of the 
General Assembly and the governor in 2020.17
The 7% rate of return assumption may have been too generous. True, since 
1900, the average total rate of return (assuming reinvested dividends) on 
the equities in the Dow Jones Industrial Average has been approximately 
9.4% (about 4.8% in price appreciation and 4.6% from reinvested 
dividends). A problem is that this growth has been uneven. The 1965 
closing value of the Dow Jones Industrial Average was 969; it was not until 
1982 that this value was permanently eclipsed. Between 1929 and 2017, the 
Dow Jones Industrial Average declined in 21 of these 88 years.18   
The obligations of public pension funds, however, do not diminish or end 
because the stock market has tanked. Consequently, pension funds such 
as the VRS must diversify their asset holdings so they can have greater 
confidence that their assets will generate income even if the stock market 
is in agony. Historically, this usually meant using some funds to invest in 
U.S. government bonds. Assets such as U.S. government bonds are almost 
universally regarded as among the most secure investments in the world.  
Risk of default is extremely low.
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A problem is that bond yields typically reside well below the rates of 
return on investments in equities. Since 10-year U.S. government bond 
yields peaked at 16.81% in September 1981, they generally have declined 
since, and in late summer 2019, the yield on 10-year U.S. government 
bonds hovered around 1.5%.19 Hence, if one desires safety and security, this 
need can be satisfied, but usually one must settle for lower rates of return. 
Graph 3 provides annual average yields on 10-year U.S. government 
bonds over the past 30 years. The vertical distance between these yields 
and the 7% VRS rate of return assumption visually depicts the nature 
of the challenging task confronting the VRS. This challenge is only 
slightly reduced if the VRS’s assumed rate of return is lowered to 6.75%. 
Faced with a long-term decline in yields for U.S. government bonds, the 
VRS must find ways to generate more significant returns. It does so by 
assuming risk, albeit knowledgeably and after due consideration.   
Ultimately, the rates of return earned on investments reflect the sum 
of the real rate of return on capital (for which we will use the 10-year 
U.S. government bond as a proxy) plus a risk premium on the collections 
of assets in which one invests. Larry Summers, the former chair of 
the President’s Council of Economic Advisors and former president of 
Harvard University, notes that real yields on inflation-adjusted 10-year 
U.S. government bonds have declined about 300 basis points over the 
past 10 years. He argues that investors (including pension funds) who 
believe they can earn 7% on a consistent basis are deluded. He opines 
that expected rate of return assumptions made by pension systems should 
be substantially lower today than they have been in the past; that is, 
lower than 7%.20 The recent declines in U.S. government bond yields only 
magnify this conclusion. 
In 2019, a growing consensus emerged in Virginia that the VRS’s 
assumed rate of return of 7% was a “bridge too far,” echoing, to some 
extent, the conclusion of Professor Summers. The VRS’s auditing firm, 
GRS Retirement Consulting, and Commonwealth Secretary of Finance 
19 “Daily Treasury Yield Curve Rates,” www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/interest-rates/pages/textview.aspx?data=yield.
20  Summers made these observations at a National Bureau of Economic Research Conference, “New Developments in Long-Term Asset Management,” held in Cambridge, Massachusetts, May 19-20, 2018. His specific comments can be 
found at https://vimeo.com/270659949.
21  Steven Haner, “State Employees Not Funding Their Own Retirement,” Bacon’s Rebellion (July 9, 2018), https://baconsrebellion.com/state-employees-not-funding-own-retirement. Michael Martz, “Virginia Retirement System Hits 7 
Percent Investment Target for Year, But Target Could Change,” Richmond Times-Dispatch (July 9, 2018), www.richmond.com/news/virginia/government-politics/virginia-retirement-system-hits-percent-investment-target-for-year-
but/article_e4599466-d4ba-5fe3-830b-e419d3f1c58b.html. Michael Martz, “VRS Raises Investment Return to 7.5 Percent for Last Fiscal Year, Beating Recent Estimate But Still Falling Short of Its Goal,” Richmond Times-Dispatch 
(Aug. 29, 2018), www.richmond.com/news/virginia/government-politics/general-assembly/vrs-raises-investment-return-to-percent-for-last-fiscal-year/article_95f05aa9-37a7-5bbb-82c9-7fdc22ef2858.html.
Aubrey Layne noted the need to examine whether the VRS should lower 
its assumed rate of return.21 The adoption of the 6.75% rate of return by 
the VRS board in October 2019 was another step in this direction. Given 
that a lower assumed rate of return will require additional contributions 
from the Commonwealth’s budget, we now await action by the General 
Assembly and Gov. Ralph Northam. 
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GRAPH 3
TEN-YEAR CONSTANT U.S. TREASURY CONSTANT MATURITY RATES: 
ANNUAL AVERAGES, 1988-2019*
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED), DGS10. *For 2019, the 10-year U.S. Treasury constant maturity rate is the average of the rate of the monthly rate data through August 2019.
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The Actual Rates Of Return
How well has the VRS performed in terms of the rates of return it has 
earned on its assets? The answer depends on whom one asks and how 
one asks the question. The VRS provides different data and metrics 
over dissimilar time periods than some external authorities, such as the 
Pew Charitable Trusts, whose recent studies of state pension funds have 
captured much attention. Further, one must be careful to differentiate 
between the rates of return earned by the VRS on its public equity 
portfolio and those earned on its entire portfolio of assets, which include 
investments in other types of assets.
In a July 6, 2018, communication to Old Dominion University’s Dragas 
Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, the VRS criticized the Pew 
Trust’s choice of a 2006 to 2015 period as “cherry picking” and in face-
to-face sessions contended that 15- to 25-year time horizons are more 
appropriate. VRS argues “apples and oranges” with respect to Pew’s 
data and says Pew defines its rates of return differently than does the 
VRS.  Regardless, if Larry Summers is on target and the United States 
has entered a period when interest rates and rates of return are going to 
remain below previously accustomed levels, then the rates of return the 
VRS likely can earn will decline. 
Graph 4 shows annualized rates of return reported by the VRS on its total 
assets over a variety of time periods ending on June 30, 2018. These data 
tell us that the VRS often has earned more than the 7% it assumes, but 
also that the last decade was a trying one. The VRS Oversight Report 
dated December 2017 revealed that the VRS earned an average rate of 
return of only 4.9% on its asset portfolio for the 10-year period ending 
Sept. 30, 2017.22 
22 Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission, VRS Oversight Report (December 2017), p. 2, file:///H:/State%20of%20the%20Commonwealth%202018/Pensions/JLARC%20Report%20on%20VRS%20Dec%202017.pdf.
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GRAPH 4
ANNUALIZED RATES OF RETURN EARNED BY THE VRS 
ON ITS ASSET PORTFOLIO FOR PERIODS ENDING JUNE 30, 2018
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The Pew Charitable Trusts, focusing on a different period (2006-2015), 
and perhaps utilizing different definitions, placed the VRS firmly in the 
middle of a 73-pension fund sample with an average rate of return that 
rose to 5.9%. Pew also provides information that allows us to compare the 
performance of the VRS with respect to other public pension funds over 
one-year, five-year and 10-year rates of return periods. Graph 5 displays 
these data, which include a 6.66% rate of return for the VRS between 
2006 and 2015 as compared to a 6.6% average rate of return for 73 public-
sector funds. 
On Sept. 8, 2019, the VRS announced that it had realized a 6.7% rate of 
return for FY 2019. The private equity investment program had an annual 
return of 14%, followed by fixed income at 8.3% and real assets at 7.8%. 
The public equity program, however, only returned 3.9% and the multi-
asset public strategies program lagged with a return of 2.2%. The VRS 
reported that the trust fund ended with approximately $82.3 billion in 
assets.23
The VRS’s rate of return performance improves if one adopts a 25-year 
time horizon rather than the 10-year vantage seen in Graph 5. As noted, 
many at the VRS believe (and we concur) that the past 10 years have been 
atypical and that this helps explain the underwhelming 6.1% rate of return 
for the 10-year period ending June 30, 2018.24 VRS professionals believe 
that the unprecedented, almost decade-long period of monetary easing 
witnessed in the United States after the Great Recession constitutes a 
financial aberration. They contend that quantitative easing favored public 
equity market performance and do not think that a similar investment 
environment is likely to reoccur in the foreseeable future. This is one 
reason why VRS personnel prefer to evaluate their performance looking 
backward for 25 years rather than adopting a 10- or 15-year perspective. 
However, the VRS’s annual reports continue to stress 10-year rates of 
23 Virginia Retirement System, “VRS Realizes 6.7% Return for Fiscal Year 2019,” https://www.varetire.org/news/2019/vrs-realizes-6.7-percent-return-for-fiscal-year-2019.asp.
24 Virginia Retirement System, Comprehensive Financial Report, 2018, p. 134.
return on its investments (see, for example, the investment section of the 
VRS 2018 annual report). If 25-year rates of return are the coin of the 
realm, then they should be given greater visibility in the VRS reports.
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GRAPH 5
VRS ANNUALIZED RATES OF RETURN: PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS ESTIMATES, 2006-2015
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How Has The VRS Fared 
Compared To The 
Overall Market?
Let’s adopt a 25-year time horizon. Consider the adjusted price per 
share of a specific no-load, low-cost mutual fund that imitates the entire 
U.S. public equity market. Vanguard’s Total Stock Market Index Fund 
(VTSMX) grew at an annual average rate of 9.29% between June 1992 and 
June 2017.25 Vanguard reports that the annual cost of VTSMX was 0.14%, 
thus the net cost annual average rate of return was 9.15%. Determining 
the net cost return of the stock market index allows a comparison with 
VRS’s public equity portfolio.
Table 1 compares the performance of Vanguard’s Total Stock Market 
Index Fund with VRS’s Public Equity portfolio from June 1992 to June 
2017.26 Over this period, the annual rate of return of VRS’s public equity 
portfolio was 8.56%, approximately 0.59% less than Vanguard’s Total 
Stock Market Index Fund. One could argue that this is not an equal 
comparison since VRS’s public equity portfolio holds non-U.S. equity 
assets, thus we caveat that our comparison approximates differences in 
rates of return.
Nevertheless, as illustrated in Table 1, Vanguard’s Total Stock Market 
Index Fund outperformed VRS’s public equity portfolio over every 
reported time period from 1992 to 2017. Recent data reinforce this 
observation, as Vanguard’s Index rose 14.7%, compared to 9.7% for 
the VRS public equity portfolio from June 2017 to June 2018. These 
differences are not trivial. 
From 1992 to 2017, the average holdings of VRS’s public equity 
investments were approximately $23.1 billion and we estimate the 
25 The adjusted price per share is from the last business day of June of the respective years. We calculate the compound annual growth rate to obtain the average annual rate of return.
26 We choose this time period to maintain consistency with the annual performance data provided graciously by the VRS for the Total Fund and Public Equity portfolio.
27  Virginia Retirement System, Comprehensive Financial Reports, Investment Section, Various Years. This is a rough calculation based on the VRS having average public equity holdings of $23.1 billion over the 25-year period. 0.73% 
of $23.1 billion is $168.63 million and 25 years * $168.63 million = $4.22 billion.  
28  Mark Perry, “More evidence that it’s very hard to ‘beat the market’ over time, 95% of finance professionals can’t do it,” AEI Ideas (March 20, 2018), http://www.aei.org/publication/more-evidence-that-its-very-hard-to-beat-the-
market-over-time-95-of-financial-professionals-cant-do-it.
29  The MSCI ACWI Investable Market Index (IMI) says it captures large, mid and small cap representation across developed markets (DM) and emerging markets (EM) countries. With 8,498 constituents, the index is comprehensive, 
covering approximately 99% of the global equity investment opportunity set, www.msci.com/documents/10199/4211cc4b-453d-4b0a-a6a7-51d36472a703.
foregone rate average annual rate of return was 0.59% after taking 
into account expenses.27 The VRS may have foregone $3.4 billion 
in returns by not indexing its public equity investments. We must, 
however, note that this estimate varies significantly year to year. 
We also must recognize that a stock market index fund may be more 
volatile than the VRS would prefer and that there is a recognizable 
tradeoff between risk and reward.
We provide some risk-adjusted analysis in Table 2. The VRS has 
graciously provided us data for a 25-year period, but we must point 
out that this period ends in 2017. The more volatile nature of VTSMX 
returns mitigates some of the differential, but this sum remains a steep 
price to pay for presumed risk aversion because the risk-adjusted rates 
of return on VRS public equity and VTSMX are almost identical. Since 
approximately one-third of all VRS assets are invested in public equity 
(and about 80% of this in domestic stocks), the VTSMX (or a similar) 
index seems an appropriate opportunity cost metric against which the 
VRS should be measured.     
Some might view hedge funds as an alternate way for the VRS to generate 
enhanced returns. However, indexed public equity funds such as those 
offered by Fidelity and Vanguard have outperformed all but a few actively 
managed hedge funds, not just over the past decade, but now over the past 
15 years, including a half decade when monetary easing was not present.28  
Further, this performance differential has held true with respect to many 
kinds of hedge funds: small cap, mid cap and large cap. This diminishes 
the attractiveness of hedge funds.
Some VRS personnel assert that over long periods of time, the cumulative 
return on its assets has been higher than a passively invested 70% 
equities/30% bonds mix, or the S&P 500 or the MSCI ACWI Investable 
Market Index (which captures global equity investments).29 Table 2 
explores this contention based on available data.
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TABLE 1
ANNUAL RATES OF RETURN: 
VANGUARD’S U.S. STOCK MARKET FUND (VTSMX) AND VRS TOTAL FUND AND PUBLIC EQUITY PERFORMANCE, 1992-2017
3 YEARS 5 YEARS 10 YEARS 15 YEARS 20 YEARS 25 YEARS
PERIOD 2014-2017 2012-2017 2007-2017 2002-2017 1997-2017 1992 - 2017
Vanguard VTSMX 
Return (Gross)
10.20% 14.46% 7.69% 9.34% 6.98% 9.29%
Vanguard VTSMX 
Return (Net of Fees)
10.06% 14.32% 7.54% 9.20% 6.84% 9.15%
VRS Public Equity 
Return
6.33% 11.64% 4.54% 7.84% 6.38% 8.56%
Net Difference 3.87% 2.68% 3.0% 1.36% 0.46% 0.59%
Sources: Virginia Retirement System, Comprehensive Financial Report, Various Years, and VRS communication to the Old Dominion University Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy. Annualized returns for periods ending 
June 30 of the respective years. Daily share price data for VTSMX obtained from Yahoo Finance. The daily adjusted price per share for the last business day of June is used to calculate the compound annual growth rate (CAGR). 
Vanguard reports an expense ratio of 0.14% and this is deducted from the estimated CAGR to obtain a net of fees rate of return.
TABLE 2
COMPARING RATES OF RETURN, STANDARD DEVIATIONS AND SHARPE RATIOS  
FOR VARIOUS ASSET GROUPS, 1992-2017




VALUE OF $100 
AFTER 25 YEARS
VRS Total Fund 8.34% 8.84% 0.943 $740.83
VRS Public Equity 8.56% 14.04% 0.610 $779.37
MSCI ACWI IMI Total World 7.19% 11.20% 0.642 $567.36
FUSEX S&P 500 9.07% 15.61% 0.581 $876.26
Passive 70/30 7.65% 10.63% 0.720 $631.46
VTSMX Total U.S. Market 9.29% 15.07% 0.616 $921.53
Sources: VRS data are from the VRS, MSCI and FUSEX, and VTSMX data are from Yahoo Finance. MSCI, FUSEX and VTSMX means and standard deviations are computed on the basis of annual averages rather than annualized 
monthly averages. MSCI data have 0.25% annual expenses deducted, while the comparable deductions are 0.09% for FUSEX, 0.10% for 70/30 and 0.14% for VTSMX. 
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One can see in Table 2 that the 25-year compound average annual rate 
of return on the VRS total fund portfolio trailed that of the other asset 
groups described in Table 2; however, the standard deviation of the VRS’s 
returns over the 25 years was also substantially less than the other asset 
groups. This means that the returns on VRS’s total portfolio were less 
variable than those earned by the other asset groups.Over the 25-year 
(1992-2017) period examined, VRS’s investment strategies resulted in a 
substantially higher modified Sharpe Ratio for its total fund than was true 
for all other asset groups. Sharpe Ratios measure return obtained per unit 
of risk assumed.30 The data in Table 2 reveal retrospectively that the VRS 
has done well in terms of generating return per unit of risk in the realm of 
public equity. This is long-term evidence that VRS investment policies 
have avoided excessively risky investments where public equities are 
concerned. At the same time, the VRS has earned respectable rates of 
return and maintained liquidity so that it can meet the demands of the 
day. 
What is a “good” Sharpe Ratio? The answer depends on the time period 
chosen because opportunities differ significantly in rising markets, as 
opposed to falling markets. Therefore, one cannot look at the VRS’s 0.943 
Sharpe Ratio in Table 2 and make many useful historical comparisons. It 
will suffice to say that the VRS’s allocation of its assets performed well 
per unit of risk it decided to bear during this time period.  
These points acknowledged, the VTSMX fund mimicking the entire U.S. 
stock market rather consistently outperformed the VRS in the public 
equity area and did so with an almost identical Sharpe Ratio. The major 
difference between the two is that the VTSMX generated both higher 
rates of return and higher standard deviations (greater volatility) than 
did VRS public equity. Using hindsight, we can say the VRS would have 
ended up substantially better off at the end of the 25-year period had 
30  The Sharpe Ratio for asset “i” is (Ri – Ci)/σi, where R is the rate of return on the asset, C is a certainty rate of return such as a Treasury bill, and σ is the standard deviation of the return. We omit Ci, a constant across asset classes 
in a specific time period, from our computations in order to underline the notion of units of return per unit of risk.
31 Virginia Retirement System, Popular Annual Financial Report as of June 30, 2018.  
it opted to place significant proportions of its public equity investments 
in VTSMX or similar fund vehicles. This strategy also would have 
enabled the VRS to reduce its investment expenses, which totaled more 
than $457 million in FY 2018.31
We (along with many economists) believe the VRS should index 
substantially larger proportions of its investments. Reports from 
former members of the VRS board reveal that the VRS did index 
most or all its public equity investments between 1994 and 2001. 
Subsequently, a different composition of board members changed the 
investment course of the pension fund. All things considered, this was 
a costly decision – though perhaps understandable. Low-cost, indexed 
investments seldom have strong appeal to those whose livelihoods 
depend in whole or part on fee generation.    
We understand that investment decisions must be made in an 
atmosphere of uncertainty. One doesn’t know what is going to happen 
in the future and for this reason we would be surprised if the economic 
environment in the next 25 years matches what we observed from 
1992 to 2017. Knowing this, one should be circumspect in critiquing 
the investment decisions made by the VRS over the past 25 years. In 
our view, the VRS made thoughtful decisions even though some of its 
decision makers may not have been familiar with the full implications 
of the empirical evidence presented in this chapter. There is room for 
evolution in this regard.
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A Demanding Assignment: 
Risk Versus Return
We again note that there does not exist a single “right” combination 
of return and risk. Some investors accept copious amounts of risk in 
search of higher returns, while others conscientiously shy away from such 
scenarios. Conceptually, the VRS is torn between the two. It is currently 
expected to earn at least 7% on its investments even while it also is 
expected to maintain liquidity and avoid investments that might impair 
its ability to meet its long-term obligations and require taxpayer bailouts. 
Lowering the assumed rate of return to 6.75% will alleviate some of the 
pressure on the VRS, but, as noted earlier, some economists believe that 
assumed rates of public pension systems should be substantially lower 
than 7%.
Other major state pension funds have reached different conclusions than 
the VRS concerning their ability to outperform the market by means of 
actively managed funds. The largest public pension fund in the United 
States, the California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS), 
decided to back away from investments in hedge funds because of high fees 
and disappointing returns.32 Subsequently, the New York City Employees 
Retirement System (NYCERS) voted to end its $1.4 billion investment in 
hedge funds with the comment that “the funds charge enormous fees for 
high-risk investments yet yield tepid results.”33
One must assume that CalPERS and the NYCERS have the ability to hire 
very talented people to select their investments, yet their hedge funds 
underperformed as they have in the rest of the world. Clearly, these two 
well-situated pension systems do not appear to share the VRS’s optimism 
that they can “beat the market” over the long run in the area of public 
equities. Partially in defense of its stance, the VRS informed us that only 
10.8% of its portfolio was devoted to hedge fund investments in July 2018.34 
We believe this percentage should be even smaller.
32 Dan Fitzpatrick, “Calpers Pulls Back from Hedge Funds,” The Wall Street Journal (July 23, 2014), www.wsj.com/articles/calpers-pulls-back-from-hedge-funds-1406156915.
33 DC37, ASCME, AFL-CIO, “New York City’s Retirement System Pulls Out of Hedge Funds” (April 14, 2016), https://dc37blog.wordpress.com/2016/04/14/new-york-citys-retirement-system-pulls-out-of-hedge-funds.  
34  This statistic was contained in an exchange between the Old Dominion University Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy and the VRS in July 2018.
35 This demonstrates that diversification, per se, does not automatically reduce risk. Assets must have negative co-variances in order for them to reduce risk (as measured by volatility) in a portfolio.
This brings us to a critical, but unavoidable, question. Should we expect 
the VRS to outperform public equity market indexes – and to do so with 
less volatility than the market – over the next decade? And, at the same 
time, should we expect the VRS to maintain reasonable liquidity?  
If these are our expectations, then they present the VRS with a very 
demanding assignment. Our considered answer to these questions is: 
“Probably not.” Why not? Very few asset managers (active or not) exhibit 
the consistent ability to earn higher than average rates of return and do 
so at lower than average levels of risk. Indeed, portfolio theory suggests 
this is impossible unless one is lucky, has inside information or possesses 
a stylized trading advantage such as a superfast computer connection that 
may provide a millisecond advantage over competitors in the speed of 
completing trades.
VRS and JLARC data tell us that the VRS did not earn its target 7% 
rate of return between 2008 and 2018, but neither did most other state 
pension funds. This stimulated most pension funds nationally to consider 
investments in collections of assets that they believe will deliver higher 
expected returns. Included in these asset mixes have been land, businesses, 
currencies, commodities and options market activities. These portfolios 
often carry with them additional expected risk even though they deliver 
diversification.35 
We believe it is unreasonable to expect the VRS on a consistent 
basis to outperform some or all other pension funds, hedge funds in 
general, or the market as measured by indexes such as the S&P 500 
or Vanguard’s VTSMX. While it is entirely reasonable to expect the 
VRS to “beat the market” in a year or even over several years, the 
preponderance of evidence is that it is quite difficult to outperform the 
market in the long term. To assume otherwise is to potentially invite 
financial peril.
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The Code of Virginia, Section 51.1-124.30:1, requires the VRS to assess its 
sensitivity and vulnerabilities to a variety of possible economic scenarios 
including reductions in its rates of return, changing benefit levels, and so 
on. Reports of these test results are submitted to the General Assembly, 
the most recent one dated December 2018. These are complex, though 
quite valuable, documents because they pose a series of “What if?” 
scenarios involving both good and bad developments. Among these are 
negative scenarios that include reductions in the rates of return the VRS 
earns on its investments, and reduced contributions from the General 
Assembly. Matters such as the long-term savings that could be realized 
if more rapid paydown of VRS’s unfunded liabilities were undertaken 




36 Pew Charitable Trusts, “State Public Pension Funds Increase Use of Complex Investments” (April 2017).
37 Virginia Retirement System, Comprehensive Annual Financial Report for the Year Ended June 30, 2018.
The Target Rate Of Return 
(Rate Of Discount): More
Pension funds must make some assumption about the rate of return they 
expect to earn on their invested funds in order to assess their financial 
viability. In 2017, the median assumed rate of return for state pension 
funds was 7.15%. Yet, from 2006 to 2016, the median rate of return was 
only 5.8%. The VRS target rate for this period was 7%, but data from the 
Pew Charitable Trusts suggest that the VRS’s actual return was 5.6%.36 
During a different 10-year period ending on Sept. 30, 2017, Virginia’s Joint 
Legislative Audit and Review Committee (JLARC) said the VRS earned 
only 4.9% on its asset portfolio. And, in yet another 10-year period, this 
one ending March 31, 2018, JLARC reported that the VRS earned a 5.9% 
rate of return on its invested assets. Another report, dated July 9, 2018, 
stated that the 5.9% rate of return exceeded the VRS’s benchmark return 
of 5.5% by 0.4%. Finally, the VRS reported a 6.1% rate of return on its 
total fund for the 10-year period ending June 30, 2018.37
A review of the publicly available data strongly suggests that a 7% rate of 
return target is overly optimistic. South Dakota, which is considered one 
of the more stable state pension systems, assumes a rate of return of 6.5%. 
The recent decision to lower VRS’s assumed rate of return to 6.75% will, 
if approved by the General Assembly and the governor, more closely align 
VRS’s assumptions with performance. However, it would also increase the 
present value of its future obligations. 
One can quibble with the categories and measurement criteria the VRS 
utilizes to evaluate its performance. The organization usually selects 
as benchmarks funds or groups of funds rather than indexes of entire 
markets against which to measure its performance.
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Since a decisive majority of hedge and actively managed funds have not 
done as well as the overall public equity market in recent years, the 
VRS can “beat the funds,” and beat benchmark performance metrics 
based upon the funds, even though it may not “beat the market” in the 
form of indexes such as VTSMX. It appears that some of the VRS’s 
benchmarks are not as demanding as they plausibly should be.
The VRS must array its future obligations and then discount them to find 
what these mean today (that is, find the “present value” of its anticipated 
future liabilities). In 2005, the VRS reduced its target rate of return to 
7.5%, and then again in 2010 to 7%. Higher target rates of return, when 
used as a rate of discount, diminish the estimated value of the VRS’s 
future financial obligations. When it decreased its target rate of return 
to 7%, this reflected financial reality (the rate of return the VRS could 
expect to earn), but simultaneously increased the present value of its 
future financial obligations. 
Following the statutory requirement which requires a pay-as-you-go 
methodology or contributions on a current disbursement basis, the VRS 
utilizes a lower rate of discount for its Line of Duty Act obligations, which 
relate to eligible survivors of individuals killed or disabled in the line of 
duty, or their survivors. In 2017, its liabilities were discounted at a 3.56% 
rate. However, these obligations account for less than 1% of the overall 
VRS obligation portfolio.
If state pension funds were held to the same accounting standard 
as private-sector pension funds, then the Governmental Accounting 
Standards Board (GASB) says it would use what is termed a “blended 
rate” of discount that combines a risk-free local or U.S. government 
bond yield with higher-risk assets such as long-term corporate bonds.38 
38  Sheila Weinberg and Eileen Norcross, “GASB 67 and GASB 68: What the New Accounting Standards Mean for Public Pension Reporting,” Mercatus Center, George Mason University (June 15, 2017), www.mercatus.org/publications/
gasb-67-68-public-pension-reporting.
39 Alicia H. Mundell, Jean-Pierre Aubry, Joshua Hurwitz and Laura Quinby, “How Would GASB Proposals Affect State and Local Pension Reporting?” (June 2012), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2316838.    
40 Alicia Mundell et al.
This could result in a discount rate as low as 4% and, in the case of the 
VRS, would substantially increase the present value of its future financial 
obligations. Alicia Mundell, a well-known pension expert at Boston 
College, and three of her colleagues modeled the impact of lower discount 
rates on 126 public pension plans using FY 2010 data. She found that even 
a modest decrease in discount rates would have caused the funds’ funding 
percentages to fall from 77% of anticipated future financial obligations to 
only 63%.39 There is consensus among economists that most public-sector 
pension funds understate their future financial obligations because they 
discount their future financial liabilities at unrealistically high rates.40
The recent VRS board decision to adopt a 6.75% assumed rate of return 
will more closely align expectations to performance but also increases the 
present value of the VRS’s future financial obligations. This illustrates the 
difficult position of VRS management. Unrealistic expectations lower the 
present value of future financial obligations and commitments from the 
Commonwealth’s budget, but also increase the risk that the VRS will fall 
short of the funds needed to meet future obligations. More closely aligning 
expectations with historical performance is a more prudent course of 
action and decreases future financial risk. However, lowering the rate of 
return has the immediate effect of increasing the present value of future 
obligations, making the VRS appear even more underfunded than it is 
now, and requires additional contributions from the Commonwealth’s 
budget.
We applaud the decision of the VRS board to lower the assumed 
rate of return to 6.75%. Undoubtedly, this decision will precipitate 
a realistic and lengthy discussion about the viability of the 
Commonwealth’s pension funds and the nature of the pensions offered 
to public-sector employees.
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Asset Mix
In order to moderate swings in the value of its asset portfolio, the VRS 
diversifies its holdings across many different asset classes, including 
equities, bonds, real estate, commodities and other assets. Like most 
informed investors, the VRS subscribes to the old maxim, “Don’t put 
all of your eggs in one basket.” In fact, the mathematics and economics 
associated with this important advice are complex, and economists 
Harry Markowitz and James Tobin won Nobel Prizes for providing and 
explaining it. For example, they clarified the principles illustrating how 
investors could minimize the risks associated with earning a rate of 
return such as 7%.41 Minimizing risk, of course, is not synonymous with 
eliminating risk.
The salient point to remember is that the higher the average rate of 
return one hopes to earn, ordinarily the higher the level of risk one must 
assume. The cost of earning a higher than average rate of return may be 
increased volatility and likely there would be some years when rates of 
return are negative. For example, in 2000, 2001 and 2002, the annual rates 
of return on the stocks in the Standard and Poor’s 500 Index were -9.03%, 
-11.85% and -21.97%, respectively.42  
Such extended declines in value exert great financial pressure on pension 
funds, which generate about 60% of their benefit payments from the 
dividends and capital gains produced by their investments. The 37.4% 
decline in equity values that occurred in 2000-2002 made it very difficult 
for any investor to generate capital gains and perhaps constitutes an 
argument in favor of asset diversification.  
These uncertainties can be compounded by pension funds’ exposure 
to fluctuations in foreign exchange rates for investments that may be 
denominated in currencies such as yen or euros.43 While the American 
economy accounts for about one-quarter of the value of the world’s 
economic activity, the most rapidly growing economies are located 
41  Markowitz and Tobin also showed how investors could maximize the rate of return they earned given whatever level of risk they were willing to tolerate. Harry M. Markowitz, “Portfolio Selection,” Journal of Finance, 7 (1952), 77-91. 
James Tobin, “Liquidity Preference as Behavior Towards Risk,” Review of Economic Studies, 25 (1961), 65-86.
42 Robert Alan Schwartz, “Annual Returns of the SEP 500 From 1928 to 2015,” Seeking Alpha, https://seekingalpha.com/instablog/605212-robert-allan-schwartz/4831186-annual-returns-s-and-p-500-1928-2015. 
43  Any investor can sell such risks to others (essentially buy an insurance policy) by purchasing options. Most pension funds do so, but similar to insurance policies, there is a cost attached to such behavior. Of course, any investor also 
can choose to buy these risks as well, and this could result either in gains or losses.
elsewhere, and hence some of the world’s prime investment opportunities 
exist outside of the United States. Such opportunities titillate investors 
with the promise of higher returns, but often carry with them higher 
levels of risk.
Given these circumstances, and the uncertainties concerning life spans and 
the like, what’s a public pension fund portfolio manager to do? He or she 
needs to generate that 7% rate of return, but even this may turn out to be 
insufficient if the state fails to make the contributions to the pension fund 
for which it is obligated.  
Graph 6 reports how the VRS was deploying its $80.4 billion in assets on 
March 31, 2019. Conventional investments in equities (stocks) and fixed-
income instruments such as bonds accounted for 56% of the value of the 
VRS’s portfolio. What the VRS terms credit strategies accounted for 14% 
of its portfolio, while real assets claimed 14%, private equity, 11%, and 
what the VRS labels strategic opportunities, 3%.  
The VRS’s asset deployment is not unusual. Most public pension funds 
have responded to their funding and rate of return challenges by investing 
their asset portfolios more aggressively. They seek higher rates of 
return on their investments, but in order to obtain the promise of such, 
ordinarily they must accept higher risks. Nearly all pension funds (the 
VRS included) now invest funds in a broad variety of assets. These include 
actively managed funds that in turn invest in risky collections of assets 
(often with borrowed funds), private equity firms that are not publicly 
listed on a stock exchange, real assets such as real estate, and commodities 
that could range from pork bellies to aluminum. The VRS, however, 
reports that its commodities investments are minimal.
If a pension fund directs more dollars toward alternative assets, then 
usually this fund needs to hire more internal talent to conduct this 
business and also pay more to outsiders such as hedge fund managers, 
who it is believed have the ability to generate higher rates of return. The 
March 31, 2018, JLARC assessment of the VRS reported that the VRS 
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internally manages 100% of its fixed income investments and 40% of its 
public equity investments, but only 6% of its real asset investments. All 
other assets are managed by external experts whom the VRS must pay for 
their services.
In 2016, the Pew Charitable Trusts reported that median state pension 
plans expended $70.9 million on expenses to administer the pension 
system, significantly less than the $390.9 million in expenses for the VRS. 
However, this may be misleading, as Virginia has one system while other 
states have several systems. Taking this potential critique into account, 
we find that the VRS’s total investment expenses were 0.58% of its total 
investments. These costs were primarily driven by external management 
fees. The VRS’s external management expenses were 0.52% of its total 
investments, above the national median of 0.34%. While the VRS’s 
external management expenses are higher than the national median, its 
performance in this regard is significantly better than some other state 
pension funds. The Arizona Public Safety Personnel Retirement System, 
for example, had management fees equal to 2.23% of investment assets 
in 2016. On the other hand, Utah, which invests 42% of its portfolio in 
alternative investments (real estate, hedge funds, etc.), only paid external 
management expenses equal to 0.13% of its total investments. These data 
suggest that the VRS could lower its external management costs.
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GRAPH 6
VRS ASSET ALLOCATION BY CATEGORY, 
MARCH 31, 2019




VRS Asset Allocation by Category, 














Public Equity Credit Strategies Fixed Income Real Assets Private Equity Strategic Opportunities Cash Other■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ 
85
However, we must take care to note that the Pew data conflict with the 
VRS’s and JLARC’s assertions that the VRS’s investment expenses have 
been lower than the national average. The VRS has also expressed serious 
concern about Pew’s definitions and its findings. Reasonable people can 
disagree on these points.
It is not clear precisely how the VRS compensates its external fund 
managers. An industry standard, however, is “2 and 20,” which translates 
to annual fees that are 2% of all managed assets plus 20% of any profits 
generated after some minimum hurdle has been met. The New York 
Times labeled this a “Heads We Win, Tails You Lose” arrangement.44 
The VRS reported in July 2018 that it kept 80% of returns in excess of 
an 8% annualized return, with the remaining 20% paid to the external 
investment managers who generated the return. As of July 2018, these 
arrangements resulted in the VRS keeping $21.9 billion in excess returns 
and $3.8 billion being paid out to external managers “since inception.”45 
However, a consensus has emerged nationally that “reported fee data are 
often unreliable and complete fee information is unknown even to the 
pension fund.”46 Fee arrangements sometimes are amazingly Byzantine.47 
Thus, when a recent study of state pension funds by the American 
Federation of Teachers concluded that 12 large public employee pension 
funds could have saved $3.8 billion annually by reducing their reliance 
upon hedge and actively managed funds, one must treat such data as rough 
approximations.  
There is no disagreement, however, that the VRS’s investment 
management expenses have risen recently (JLARC says 48% between FY 
13 and FY 17),48 presumably for two reasons. First, the VRS has been 
investing greater proportions of its funds externally rather than in the 
public equities and fixed income instruments it manages internally,49 and 
44 As reported by the American Federation of Teachers, “The Big Squeeze” (2017), www.aft.org/sites/default/files/bigsqueeze_may2017.pdf.
45 Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission, VRS Oversight Report (July 2018). It is not clear from the report what time period or periods “since inception” comprises.
46 American Federation of Teachers. Pew agrees.
47 Gretchen Morgenson, “The Deal’s Done. But Not the Fees,” The New York Times (May 24, 2014), www.nytimes.com/2014/05/25/business/the-deals-done-but-not-the-fees.html.
48 Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission, VRS Oversight Report (December 2017), p. 7, http://jlarc.virginia.gov/pdfs/reports/Rpt504.pdf.
49 The supposition of the American Federation of Teachers.  
50  Mark Perry, “More evidence that it’s very hard to ‘beat the market’ over time, 95% of finance professionals can’t do it,” AEI Ideas (March 20, 2018), http://www.aei.org/publication/more-evidence-that-its-very-hard-to-beat-the-
market-over-time-95-of-financial-professionals-cant-do-it.
51 www.fidelity.com/about-fidelity/fidelity-by-numbers/corporate-statistics.
52 Fidelity 500 Index Fund, https://fundresearch.fidelity.com/mutual-funds/composition/315911206 (accessed April 9, 2018).   
this results in higher fee payments. Second, rising equity prices during this 
period may also have resulted in higher fee payments.  
An irony attached to this circumstance is that for a decade or more, the 
typical hedge or actively managed fund consistently has underperformed 
public equity markets overall. Put differently, a typical investor could have 
invested in an equity index fund marketed by a well-established provider 
such as Fidelity or Vanguard, then lapsed into a deep coma, and woken 
up a decade later to find that he or she consistently had outperformed 
the actively managed funds. In a typical year, 60% to 80% of hedge and 
actively managed funds do not perform as well as the S&P 500 average. 
In 2018, the average hedge fund lost 5.23%, while the S&P 500 fell only 
4.38%.  
Graph 7 reports similar annual information for the 2009-2018 period. 
Note the 10-year losing streak of hedge funds versus the S&P 500 Index. 
From 2002 to 2017, 92.33% of actively managed large cap funds failed 
to outperform the S&P 500; 94.81% of actively managed mid cap funds 
failed to outperform the S&P MidCap 400 Index; and 95.73% of actively 
managed small cap funds failed to outperform the S&P SmallCap 600 
Index.50 Fidelity, which on March 31, 2018, managed $2.09 trillion in 
mutual fund assets,51 offers its FUSEX 500 Index Fund, which is designed 
to replicate the equities in the S&P 500. FUSEX returned 9.42% annually 
over the past 10 years and its expense ratio was a miniscule .09%.52 This 
compares to the VRS’s 6.66% annual rate of return over the 2006-2015 
period (but 4.9% for the 10 years ending Sept. 30, 2017) and investment 
expenses of 0.55%. The VRS could have increased its rate of return by 
2.76% and reduced its expenses by .46% had it indexed its investments 
solely in public equities (not a strategy we would recommend for a variety 
of reasons, but an interesting comparison nonetheless).  
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The lesson is that most public pension funds have the potential to 
reduce their expenses if they opt to use indexed public equity funds 
rather than their own staff or external fund managers. We recognize 
moving in this direction is anathema to many at the VRS, but the 
potential savings command attention.  
There is an interesting analog to this discussion. University endowments 
bear some similarity to pension funds in terms of the return vs. risk 
dilemma, though they can more easily reduce payments to endowment 
account holders than can pension funds. In recent years, university 
foundations and endowments have engaged in many of the same 
investment strategies as pension funds. The results have been less than 
spectacular. Over the past decade, university endowments returned an 
average of 4.6% on their investments. This trailed the 5.3% rate of return 
that a simple 60/40 stock/bond index fund mix would have returned or 
the 5.4% rate of return that a simple 70/30 stock/bond index fund mix 
would have returned.53 That is, they could have done better by “indexing” 
(investing in funds that imitate entire markets or segments of markets 
rather than investing in specific stocks or bonds, to minimize their trading 
and offer much lower management costs as one consequence).     
Investment professionals who make their living from the fees they earn 
from actively investing funds on behalf of their clients often supply a 
blizzard of reasons why their services are valuable, if not irreplaceable. 
Some of their arguments do resonate. For example, whole market index 
funds such as those offered by Fidelity and Vanguard54 do not contain 
assets or companies that are new on the scene, or are not publicly traded, 
and thus one could miss potentially superb opportunities if one only 
indexes the public firms via a fund such as the FUSEX 500. 
Nevertheless, the arguments put forward by active investment 
professionals can tend to be self-serving. They make their living by 
convincing the VRS and other pension funds to hire them to manage their 
portfolios. Each is a master at explaining why they and their approach to 
investing are different – why they will succeed even while others rather 
consistently fall short.  
53 A nontechnical rendition of this situation may be found at James B. Steward, “College Endowments Opt for Alternative, and Less Lucrative, Route,” The New York Times (Feb. 22, 2018).
54  The VRS commented to us via email that “VRS provides index funds for cheaper than Fidelity because we are doing so with internal staff.” However, these individuals and their activities are not gratis. They have opportunity costs 
and hence the comparison with Fidelity and Vanguard is not apt.
55 “Vulture Capitalist,” Investopedia, www.investopedia.com/terms/vulturecapitalist.asp.
Ultimately, evidence should rule the day. Consider that a 10% reduction 
in annual investment costs for the VRS would translate to savings of 
approximately $45 million annually. A 0.1% increase in the rate of return 
the VRS realizes on its public equity investments similarly would add 
about $40 million to its coffers. These are possibilities that should not be 
ignored.
We do not argue that the VRS should index all its investments, or 
avoid all higher cost fund managers, though today it is possible 
to index nearly any significant asset – commodities, real estate, 
international assets and currencies in addition to equities and bonds. 
We agree that index investments don’t always outperform actively 
managed assets and some specific active investment strategies 
may exploit less well-known asset segments and possible market 
inefficiencies to outperform indexes. In addition, indexed investments 
could be more volatile than some actively managed investments. Again, 
the salient point is that a significant majority of actively managed 
funds fail to do as well as the market on a consistent basis. Hence, we 
recommend that the VRS index a larger proportion of its public equity 
portfolio and that it assess carefully the extent to which indexing might 
be useful in other asset classes as well.  
The VRS responded to this suggestion in a July 6, 2018, email: “Private 
equity has been great for VRS. Indexing these funds would adversely 
impact the plan.” We largely agree with this conclusion because data 
supplied by the VRS indicate that what it labels its “private equity” 
investments (as opposed to “public equity”) often have generated higher 
rates of return and exhibited lower variability than VRS’s public equity 
investments. Sound principles of diversification make some private equity 
investments a good idea for the VRS. We would insert a caveat, however. 
The VRS’s private equity investments may involve it investing in funds 
that purchase public firms, take them private, then disgorge many of their 
assets and ultimately lead them into bankruptcy. Some label this vulture 
capitalism,55 and decry it, but in recent years it often has been a profitable 
strategy.    
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Defined Benefit Versus 
Defined Contribution 
Pension Programs
Earlier, we sketched the differences between defined benefit, defined 
contribution and hybrid public pension programs. Historically, most public 
employee pension programs have been defined benefit rather than defined 
contribution in nature.  
Many public employees prefer defined benefit programs because such 
programs guarantee them a specific income for the remainder of their 
lives. Further, depending on the length of their service and their highest 
earning years, defined benefit programs may produce very respectable 
retirement incomes for them, especially if accompanied by cost-of-living 
escalators that usually are not present in defined contribution programs. 
Also, depending on how the funds in a defined contribution program 
are invested, a recipient’s income from that program could increase or 
decrease.   
Taxpayers and citizens find the problem with defined benefit retirement 
obligations is that they frequently become fiscally burdensome. Longer 
life spans mean that government pension obligations extend well beyond 
the time periods originally anticipated. Lower interest rates make it 
more difficult for pension funds to earn respectable rates of return on 
traditional low-risk assets such as U.S. government bonds. We have seen 
this has pushed pension funds into adopting riskier investment mixes 
involving more equities, commodities and real estate in an attempt to 
generate higher rates of return.    
Pension contributions account for increasing proportions of the budgets 
of state and local government units. States such as Illinois face disastrous 
fiscal situations, substantially because of their burgeoning public employee 
pension obligations. California’s Gov. Jerry Brown gained attention in 
early 2018 when he expressed his hope that California courts would rule 
56 Romy Varghese, “California’s Brown Raises Prospect of Pension Cuts in Downturn,” Bloomberg (Jan. 10, 2018), www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-10/california-s-brown-raises-prospect-of-pension-cuts-in-downturn.
57 Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission, VRS Oversight Report (July 2018).
58 Virginia Retirement System, Popular Annual Financial Report as of June 30, 2018.
that pension benefits promised to state employees could be rolled back by 
the state. His changing stance on this matter reflected fiscal reality: in FY 
2017, California spent double the amount on pensions as it spent in FY 
2009.56 It is worth noting that from the standpoint of taxpayers, Virginia’s 
plans are more modest than those of California.
The General Assembly has taken positive steps to extend the reach 
of hybrid retirement programs. Since Jan. 1, 2014, most new state 
employees, teachers and local employees enroll in a hybrid plan that 
combines defined benefit and defined contribution features. On March 
31, 2018, 24% of the total active VRS membership was participating in 
a hybrid plan.57  
A problem here is that 43% of hybrid plan participants do not make 
contributions other than those required of them.58 This means that they 
forfeit a generous matching contribution offered by the Commonwealth 
and damage their long-term financial status. 
The General Assembly can assist by continuing to mandate policy 
“nudges.” The Commonwealth’s hybrid plan currently contains an auto-
escalation feature whereby every three years, participants’ voluntary 
contributions are increased by 0.5% if they aren’t already contributing 
the maximum 4%. Those who contribute the 4% match receive a 2.5% 
contributory match from the Commonwealth. Thus, if they do not 
choose to contribute 4%, then they are leaving money on the table and 
diminishing their eventual retirement stipend. If VRS participants who 
are not contributing the 4% maximum use the internet to log into their 
VRS accounts, then they are politely informed that they are not serving 
themselves well and immediately provided with opportunities to increase 
their contributions so that they can capture the Commonwealth’s matching 
funds.
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The Commonwealth might, however, require more generous contributions 
from new participants at the start, but permit them to revoke this 
guidance after several years.59 Experience in other states suggests that 
large proportions of individuals who are so nudged become accustomed 
to the higher level of contributions and continue them even when they no 
longer are required to do so. In the long term, nudges stimulate what most 
authorities regard as optimal economic choices for participants, though 
they are not choices most participants initially make if they have the 
freedom to do otherwise. 
The Commonwealth’s long-term goal should be to move additional 
classes of employees entirely into defined contribution programs 
similar to those now available to faculty and to have all other 
employees enrolled in the hybrid plan. It should walk this path because 
this constitutes an important step toward guaranteeing that Virginia will 
avoid the public employee pension problems that have afflicted so many 
other states.60 
The experience of the federal government in this regard is instructive. 
Fiscal stress in the 1980s pushed the U.S. government in the direction 
of enrolling all new federal workers in Social Security if they were not 
already participants, diminishing the generosity of its existing defined 
benefit program, and creating a defined contribution program with 
matching employer/employee contributions. The now mandatory program 
has proved to be popular with federal employees and has controlled the 
expansion of the government’s future financial obligations (Gale et al. for 
Brookings, 2016).  
59 See Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Welfare and Happiness (New Haven: Yale, 2008).
60  Initially, this policy might be more expensive to Virginia than either the current hybrid program or a defined benefit program. If in the long term, however, it reduces the Commonwealth’s financial liabilities and eliminates the 
possibility that Virginia in the future might imitate states such as Illinois and Connecticut, then it will have been worthwhile. Numerous states have asserted that “it can’t happen here,” only to find that changing economic and 
political conditions have rendered their predictions null. Pew has reported that the public employee pension plans of the 50 states were underfunded by $1.4 billion in 2016. Pew Memorial Trusts, “The State Pension Funding Gap: 
2016,” www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2018/04/the-state-pension-funding-gap-2016.
61 Employees “vest” after five years of service credit.
Portability
The lack of portability of state pension funds is an area where the 
Commonwealth does not treat state employees as well as it should. 
Excepting those state employees who opt to participate in an alternative 
pension system such as TIAA-CREF, vested61 state employees who wish 
to “cash out” their Virginia retirement account (perhaps because they 
are moving to a job outside of state government) may receive back their 
contributions to the VRS plus interest, but not those contributions made 
by the Commonwealth. This assumes the departing employee has not 
become separated because of job performance or misconduct.
The alternative is for employees to leave their contributions with the 
VRS and to have their ultimate pension payment be based upon their 
current salary, which typically does not turn out to be an attractive choice. 
VRS credits only 4% of interest to withdrawn employee contributions, 
even though it assumes it is earning substantially higher rates of return. 
One well-positioned observer of this arrangement told us, “In a world 
of increasing labor mobility, such a system is disgraceful.” We agree. 
The Commonwealth should: (1) allow vested employees who leave state 
employment to retain the Commonwealth’s contributions; and (2) credit 
those contributions with a rate of return other than 4%, for example, a 
rate closer to the VRS’s long-term rate of return on its investments. If the 
VRS earns the 7% rate of return it currently assumes, then it still will 
have earned a surplus on this account that it is not returning to departing 
employees.   
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Summarizing Proposals 
For Change
We applaud the VRS for being a transparent, generally well-managed 
operation. Its quality stewardship has enabled Virginia to avoid the 
unfortunate pension experiences of many other states. Ronald E. 
Schmitz, VRS’s chief investment officer, reported recently that “the 
VRS investment staff continues to generate good performance” and in 
general, we agree.  
Our measured judgment is that the VRS is an intelligently managed 
operation that has avoided most of the problems that have afflicted 
public employee pension systems in other states. An even-handed view 
of the VRS leads to the conclusion that it deserves higher than average 
scores for its performance. However, careful, nonpolitical direction and 
the changes we outline here are needed to guide Virginia’s pension funds 
through the challenges of coming decades. With this in mind, we believe 
the General Assembly and the VRS should implement the following four 
changes in public employee pensions.
First, the VRS should index larger proportions of its asset portfolio 
and especially do so inside its domestic public equity portfolio, where 
approximately one-third of all its assets reside. The evidence in 
this area speaks loudly – indexed public equity funds consistently have 
outperformed most actively managed public equity funds; this has been 
true for the last 15 years. Further, if we lengthen our time horizon to 25 
years, Vanguard’s low-cost VTSMX indexed fund reflecting the entire 
U.S. stock market has generated a higher rate of return than the VRS has 
within its own public equity sphere and has achieved this with essentially 
the same Sharpe Ratio. We understand that managers of hedge funds 
and active investors persistently contend that they are exceptions to 
accumulated empirical evidence and therefore have the ability to produce 
both above-average returns and below-average volatility. Even though this 
might prove true for a certain period, it is unlikely to persist, and hence, 
following such advice is a bet Virginia would be wise to decline. 
62  Joint Legislative Audit and Review Committee, VRS Overview Report (July 9, 2018), at p. 48, http://jlarc.virginia.gov/pdfs/oversight/VRS/2018_VRS-Pres.pdf.
Second, the Commonwealth should accelerate the movement of state 
employees from defined benefit programs into defined contribution 
and hybrid retirement programs. However, while doing so, the VRS 
needs to find more effective ways to increase the voluntary contributions 
that participants make to their personal hybrid programs. Additional 
statutory “nudges” should be considered. Enhanced participation would 
benefit VRS members and simultaneously reduce the Commonwealth’s 
future financial risks and exposure. With respect to this latter point, the 
VRS estimates that the hybrid retirement program would reduce risk to 
employers within the defined benefit program by about one-third.62
Third, gradually, perhaps over a period as long as 20 years, the VRS 
should reduce its target rate of return (rate of discount). This would 
result in larger estimates of the future pension fund financial obligations 
of the VRS but would be consistent with the way private firms are 
required to assess their portfolios and estimate their future financial 
obligations. Because this action would necessitate some combination 
of larger state and local government pension contributions, larger 
employee contributions or diminished benefits, it would require extensive 
conversations with the General Assembly. 
Fourth, the Commonwealth should improve the portability of the state 
employees’ VRS accounts. As things stand, vested employees who depart 
state employment receive only their own contributions (not those of the 
Commonwealth) plus a 4% rate of interest on their contributions. The 
alternative for these individuals is to leave their contributions with the 
VRS, which means that ultimately, they would receive pension payments 
based on what their salary was when they departed. Ordinarily, this is not 
an attractive choice. The Commonwealth can and should do better in an 
era characterized by high levels of employee mobility. 
Should the Commonwealth not move in these directions, then the 
probability increases that it will experience future public pension 
problems. By no means do we see disaster looming on the horizon; 
however, very few analysts foresaw the financial implosion of 2008-2009. 
Considered in this light, our recommendations represent fiscally prudent 
courses of action.  
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